Each month, Nebula Consulting posts vulnerability notes from CERT’s vulnerability database. Check back often for updates! 03 Aug 2017 - VU#824672 - Microsoft Windows automatically executes code specified in shortcut (LNK) files.
Microsoft Windows supports the use of shortcut or LNK files. A LNK file is a reference to a local file. Clicking on a LNK or file has essentially the same outcome as clicking on the file that is specified as the shortcut target. For example, clicking a shortcut to calc.exe will launch calc.exe, and clicking a shortcut to readme.txt will open readme.txtwith the associated application for handling text files.
Microsoft Windows fails to safely obtain icons for shortcut files. When Windows displays Control Panel items, it will initialize each object for the purpose of providing dynamic icon functionality. This means that a Control Panel applet will execute code when the icon is displayed in Windows. Through use of a shortcut file, an attacker can specify a malicious DLL that is to be processed within the context of the Windows Control Panel, which will result in arbitrary code execution. The specified code may reside on a USB drive, local or remote filesystem, a CD-ROM, or other locations. Viewing the location of a shortcut file with Windows Explorer is sufficient to trigger the vulnerability. Other applications that display file icons can be used as an attack vector for this vulnerability as well.
By convincing a user to display a specially-crafted shortcut file, an attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the user. Depending on the operating system and AutoRun/AutoPlay configuration, this can happen automatically by connecting a USB device.
Solution: Apply an update. This issue is addressed in the Microsoft Update for CVE-2017-8464.
29 Aug 2017 - VU#403768 - Akeo Consulting Rufus fails to update itself securely
Akeo Consulting Rufus fails to securely check for and retrieve updates, which an allow an authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable system.
Akeo Consulting Rufus 2.16 retrieves updates over HTTP. While Rufus does attempt to perform some basic signature checking of downloaded updates, it does not ensure that the update was signed by a trusted certificate authority (CA). This lack of CA checking allows the use of a self-signed certificate. Because of these two weaknesses, an attacker can subvert the update process to achieve arbitrary code execution.
An attacker on the same network as, or who can otherwise affect network traffic from, a Rufus user can cause the Rufus update process to execute arbitrary code.
Solution: This issue is addressed in Rufus 2.17.1187.